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Abstract
In February 2019, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) created a set of comprehensive
rules governing the qualifications for participating in the 2020 primary debates. The rules, the
first of their kind, were the result of over a decade of primary debate mishaps and disagreements.
Historically, it was not difficult for candidates to qualify for primary debates. There were usually
fewer than eight candidates on the stage and the debates did not play a large role in the primary
winnowing process. But as the number of candidates rose, and in light of the Republican’s
experience in 2016, the Democrats moved to create new rules to re-assert control over the
process in 2020. This had three important effects. First, it helped to winnow down the field
during the 2020 primary, as once candidates were not on the stage, they were effectively shut out
of the media spotlight and thus out of the public’s consideration. Second, the new rules
demonstrate an effort by the party to reduce the media’s power and increase their own, though
that process is incomplete. Third, these rules illustrate a key dilemma for the DNC in the modern
era. They are attempting to assert control without appearing to assert control, thus posing an
interesting challenge moving forward.
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Introduction
In early August 2019, Democratic presidential candidate Senator Kirsten Gillibrand was offering
branded t-shirts in exchange for a $1 donation. Assuming the custom t-shirt cost $5, the shipping
and handling cost $5 and the digital advertisement cost $2 per realized donation, she was
spending $12 to acquire a $1 donation.1 Why would a candidate—especially a candidate
struggling for money and recognition—spend so much to acquire so little? Normally, we would
say such an attempt defies logic, but here, there is clear logic: she was attempting to meet the
Democratic National Committee’s (DNC) grassroots fundraising threshold for the third primary
debate on September 12th, 2019.
To qualify for the September debate, Gillibrand or any other candidate would need to
receive at least 130,000 individual donations and/or receive 2% percent in at least four qualifying
polls.2 At the time of her request, Gillibrand failed to meet the donor threshold and only had one
poll with over 2% support.3 To her chagrin, she failed to make the debate and subsequently
dropped out of the race.4 Gillibrand’s story is not unique. Many other candidates—from Kamala
Harris to Cory Booker to Steve Bullock—would use similarly counterintuitive tactics to try to

Author’s note: I would like to express my great appreciation to Dr. Matthew Levendusky for his
insightful and constructive suggestions during the planning and development of this thesis. His
willingness to give his time so generously has been much appreciated.
1
Shirt price on customink.com; Standard Group on UPS.com; digital advertising
assuming .5% penetration on Facebook.
2
“DNC Announces Details for Third Presidential Primary Debate,” Democrats, May 29,
2019, https://democrats.org/news/third-debate/
3
Burns, Alexander. “Gillibrand Drops Out of 2020 Democratic Presidential Race.” The
New York Times. The New York Times, August 28, 2019.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/us/politics/kirsten-gillibrand-2020-drop-out.html.
4
Dan Merica, “Kirsten Gillibrand Drops out of 2020 Presidential Race,” CNN (Cable
News Network, August 29, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/28/politics/gillibrand-dropsout-of-race/index.html)
3
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make the primary debate stage during the 2020 campaign. The DNC’s decision to include
fundraising qualifications fundamentally changed the 2020 Democratic primary race.
This thesis works to understand why the DNC added these rules in 2020 and what effect
they had on the process. Looking at the historical process, I argue that the party learned—or at
least tried to learn—from earlier cycles and they developed rules that would help them control
which candidates would appear on the debate stage, without appearing to shape it too much.
These conflicting incentives reverberated through this process, and ultimately determined which
candidates survived and which did not.
Primary debates are so central because primary voters cannot use partisanship as a
heuristic device. In a general election, most voters simply vote for the candidate from their party.
But in a primary election, all candidates share the same party, so the heuristic provides little help
in making the decision. Candidates therefore must work hard to clearly differentiate themselves
from their rivals on some salient dimension. However, in a crowded field and in a fractured
media market, capturing and holding the public’s attention is extremely difficult. The primary
debates offer candidates—especially those struggling to receive media coverage—an opportunity
to do just that. In fact, the first 2020 Democratic debates on June 26 and 27th, 2019 had a total of
33.4 million viewers, or 13 million more viewers than an average Sunday Night Football game.5
Unsurprisingly then, a strong debate appearance—and a consensus among post-debate
commentators that a candidate scored political points—boosts a candidate’s standing in the polls

5

Cline, Seth. “Americans Have Stopped Watching the Democratic Debates.” U.S. News
& World Report. U.S. News & World Report, December 20, 2019.
https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/2019-12-20/americans-have-stopped-watchingthe-democratic-debates.
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and increases donations to his or her campaign.6 For example, Senator Kamala Harris’ breakout
performance in the first Democratic debate in June 2019 contributed significantly to her rise in
the polls and perceived legitimacy.7 About an hour into the first Democratic debate for 2020, Ms.
Harris, a black former prosecutor, criticized frontrunner Joe Biden who was leading the polls at
the time, for working with segregationist senators in the 1970s and 1980s.8 Then, she attacked
Joe Biden’s opposition to bussing in the 1970s, saying “there was a little girl in California who
was a part of the second class to ingrate her public schools….and that girl was me.”9 She not
only gained popularity for her comments toward Joe Biden, but also from the post-debate
coverage that replayed the exchange and exalted her performance. She capitalized on her debate
performance, boosting her polling numbers at the expense of Joe Biden’s.10 The debates are
especially significant for long-shot candidates, such as Harris, who do not have many other
opportunities to present their campaign’s pitch to a broad captive audience. Primary debates
therefore are a critical aspect of the presidential nomination process and are capable of changing
voters’ attitudes toward candidates.11

6

Fridkin, Kim L., Patrick J. Kenney, Sarah Allen Gershon, Karen Shafer, and Gina
Serignese Woodall. “Capturing the Power of a Campaign Event: The 2004 Presidential Debate in
Tempe.” The Journal of Politics 69, no. 3 (2007): 770-85.
7
Schouten, Fredreka. “Kamala Harris Shines in Commanding Democratic Debate
Performance.” CNN. Cable News Network, June 28, 2019.
https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/27/politics/kamala-harris-democratic-debateperformance/index.html.
8
Stevens, Matt. “When Kamala Harris and Joe Biden Clashed on Busing and
Segregation.” The New York Times. The New York Times, July 31, 2019.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/31/us/politics/kamala-harris-biden-busing.html.
9
Ibid.
10
Stevens, Matt. “Kamala Harris Surges in 3 Polls After Strong Debate Performance.”
The New York Times. The New York Times, July 2, 2019.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/us/politics/kamala-harris-polls.html.
11
Fridkin et al.
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Despite the importance of presidential primary debates, the topic is remarkably
understudied. Political science research has primarily focused on the party’s role in the
nomination process and communications scholars have largely directed their attention to
identifying the effects of the media’s coverage of primaries, debate rhetoric and formats.12 Here,
I examine the requirements for making the primary debate stage and how that process has
changed over time, focusing on the 2008, 2012, and 2016 presidential primaries and on the
Democratic party. I analyze these earlier elections to try to understand how these events
influenced the Democratic party’s decision in the 2020 cycle. I also analyze the 2016 Republican
primaries, as the Democrats no doubt had this experience in their mind as they deliberated about
how to execute their own 2020 primary.
I argue that there were four crucial factors that explain why the DNC changed the
primary debate process in 2020. First, I hypothesize that the increase in the number of candidates
vying for the party’s nomination contributed to the DNC’s decision to take control of the debate
requirements. The party would like a short-lived and relatively controversy free primary
process—a small field where a party insider could easily capture the nomination. Their fear is
that a long primary may weaken the ultimate candidate and make it more difficult to unite the
party, so the party would prefer a short and relatively conflict-free process. In addition, after
witnessing the chaos during the Republican Party’s primary in 2016, the DNC decided they
wanted a more controlled process. Prior to 2020, the Democratic primary debates played a
limited role in winnowing the field, instead allowing candidates to drop out naturally. In 2020,

12

Cohen, Marty. The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations before and after Reform.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.; Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, and Christopher
Adasiewicz. “What Can Voters Learn from Election Debates?” Televised Election Debates,
2000, 25–42.
6
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the DNC would attempt to use strict debate qualification rules to pressure candidates to drop out
earlier. They believed that failure to make the debate stage would be a signal to voters that a
candidate is no longer viable and therefore pressure the candidate to drop out. Stricter rules
would help to winnow the field.
Second, I hypothesize that the DNC made the primary requirement change to clarify
previous inconsistencies in the rules. In previous cycles, primary debate rules were either set by
the party or news networks. In many cases, the rules were not clearly communicated to
candidates. The ensuing confusion and complaints made the DNC seem disorganized and biased.
Third, I hypothesize that the DNC created the rules to take power out of the hands of forprofit media outlets. While media outlets are incentivized by profit, the DNC is concerned with
producing a viable candidate in the general election. The misaligned incentives created friction
between the party and news outlets. The DNC created a policy that works in the party’s favor.
Finally, I hypothesize that the new criteria, which are stricter than in past cycles,
disproportionately hurt longshot candidates. The rules make it more difficult to qualify for
debates and function to winnow the field quickly. Better known candidates with organized
campaigns and early funding are much more likely to make the debate stage and stand out to
voters.
This thesis begins with a discussion of the previous political science and communications
literature on the topic, and then presents a historical analysis of previous debate requirements
with a focus on the 2008, 2016 and 2020 election cycles. After the analysis, I discuss my
hypotheses and the evidence that supports them. Finally, I conclude by summarizing the findings
and their importance and offering advice on future research.
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Literature Review
A political party, according to Edmund Burke, is an association of persons united by a common
principle.13 In Political Parties, Durverger classifies political parties as organized groups seeking
power through Democratic elections or revolution.14 While these two scholars define parties
using political theory, Robert Hucksburn offers a more pragmatic definition. He believes parties
are “an autonomous group of citizens having the purpose of making nominations and contesting
elections in the hope of gaining control over governmental power through the capture of public
offices and the organization of government.”15 Similarly, Aldrich believes that competition for
office is the “singular, defining characteristic of the major American political party.”16 Aldrich
concludes that these groups are ultimately concerned with winning above all else.17 A political
party is thus an organized group of people that try to elect politicians that share their common
principles.
Political scholars are consistent in their view that parties seek to recruit candidates that
can win elections to implement their policy goals. In Down’s view, parties seek to win elections
and translate them into legislative achievements.18 The party’s new policies will help them gain
new supporters in future elections. In theory, the relationship between elections and policy
creates a positive feedback loop. In sum, parties are tasked with finding the candidates that are

13

Burke, Edmund. Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents: Volume 1
Paperback. New Edition ed., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2012. muse.jhu.edu/book/18234.
14
Duverger, M. Political Parties. London: Methuen, 1978.
15
Huckshorn, R. J. Political Parties in America. Monterey: Brooks-Cole Publishing
Company, 1984.
16
Aldrich, John H. Why Parties?: Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in
America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, 283, 12.
17
Ibid, 21.
18
Downs, Anthony. “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy.” Journal
of Political Economy 65, no. 2 (1957): 135-50. Accessed February 19, 2020.
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best able to win elections and support the party agenda. Using this definition, scholars have
attempted to determine the specific groups within a party that set the party’s platform and control
the nomination process.
Scholars disagree on who wields power in political parties. Schattsneider’s theory
emphasizes the importance of interest groups. His theory assumes that government authority is
for specific policy purposes.19 He finds that a party that can serve interest groups and enact their
policies will be successful in the long-run. Similarly, McCarty and Schickler conclude that
parties are best viewed as coalitions of intense policy demanders.20 Cohen notes that “across the
entire span of American history, parties behave in the same basic way—as vehicles by which the
most energized segments of the population attempt to pull government policy toward their own
preferences.”21 These scholars place interest groups and activists at the center of the party. While
these theories are important for understanding how party platforms and policy are crafted, the
influence of intense-policy demanders and interest groups is subdued early in the presidential
primary process. Instead, the political elite play an outsized role at the beginning of the
nomination season.
Unlike congressional primaries, to succeed in a presidential primary, a candidate needs to
develop a large organization, a strong fundraising base, and endorsements from key political
leaders. In congressional and local primary elections, the barriers to entry are relatively low and

19

Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson. “After the ‘Master Theory’: Downs,
Schattschneider, and the Rebirth of Policy-Focused Analysis.” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 3
(2014): 643–62. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592714001637.
20
Mccarty, Nolan, and Eric Schickler. “On the Theory of Parties.” Annual Review of
Political Science 21, no. 1 (November 2018): 175–93. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci061915-123020.
21
Cohen, Marty. The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations before and after Reform.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.
9
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a robust grassroots campaign can carry the day. In 2018, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez famously
defeated Joe Crowley, a 20-year veteran in the House and establishment Democrat, in the
primary for New York’s 14th district. In this sort of local contest, a long-shot has at least a
chance to defeat an establishment candidate.
However, due to the complex nature of the presidential nomination process, the barriers
to entry are extremely high. To be competitive, candidates must establish a large cash base and a
strong campaign organization even before the first primary or caucus.22 First, candidates are
forced to campaign in states in which many of them have never competed. They need to develop
new relationships with local organizers that can help them host events and increase their name
recognition. Candidates without national appeal or connections have a lot of trouble developing
these networks. Moreover, candidates have dozens of expenses that they need to cover, including
campaign offices, staff salaries and advertisements. In addition, Democratic campaigns need
hundreds of thousands of dollars for voter registration files for early primary states. These files
help the candidates determine where to focus their campaign’s energy in the early states.23 If a
candidate does well in the early states, they will need additional funds to mobilize their campaign
across over a dozen states for Super Tuesday, assuming they have not already done so. The vast
network and extreme costs associated with presidential primaries make it difficult for lesser
known local politicians or non-billionaires to compete.

22

Adkins, Randall E., and Andrew J. Dowdle. “The Money Primary: What Influences the
Outcome of Pre-Primary Presidential Nomination Fundraising?” Presidential Studies
Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2002): 256-75. Accessed February 19, 2020.
www.jstor.org/stable/27552387.
23
DeSilver, Drew. “Voter Files: What Are They, How Are They Used and Are They
Accurate?” Pew Research Center. Pew Research Center, February 15, 2018.
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/02/15/voter-files-study-qa/.
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Primary candidates are more dependent on those with connections, also known as the
party elite, than they are in congressional primaries—for example, think of the crucial role
played by South Carolina Representative Jim Clyburn in 2020. His endorsement of Vice
President Joe Biden galvanized supporters and catapulted Biden to an overwhelming victory in
the state.24 After that victory, the rest of the party consolidated behind him and Biden was able to
accumulate an effectively insurmountable delegate lead by mid-March, despite having been
declared effectively dead a few weeks prior. While this case is perhaps the most vivid example in
recent decades, one could tell a similar (albeit less dramatic) story about Hillary Clinton’s
eventual win over Sanders in 2016. Even before the first primary, Hillary Clinton had raised
significantly more money and gained more endorsements than Sanders. Being able to unite the
party behind you is crucial in a presidential campaign.
Many scholars have focused on how the party elite exercises its power in presidential
primary elections. This takes place before the first primary, known as the invisible primary. The
group consists of present and former congressmen, senators, governors and wealthy donors.
They influence the process by endorsing candidates in the race.25 Elite endorsements can help
candidates by serving as a sign to voters of legitimacy. Elites can also help candidates by tapping
into their local connections to integrate the candidate and their campaign staff in the community.
Moreover, elites can influence media coverage on behalf of a candidate and help them raise
money. Cohen asserts that endorsements are predictors of a candidate’s support, media coverage

24

Davis, Susan. “Joe Biden Gets Boost With Endorsement Of Influential South Carolina
Democrat.” NPR, February 26, 2020. https://www.npr.org/2020/02/26/808856350/clyburnendorses-biden-ahead-of-south-carolina-primary.
25
Steger, Wayne P. “Conditional Arbiters: The Limits of Political Party Influence in
Presidential Nominations.” PS: Political Science & Politics 49, no. 4 (2016): 709–15.
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and fundraising.26 He concludes that party support is the judgement of a small group of party
members. Successful candidates are those that have built strong campaigns during the invisible
primary.
Finally, Anderson finds that party elite have an incentive to “nominate an electorally
viable and ideologically unifying candidate.”27 For the elite, supporting a losing candidate is an
extremely risky decision. While they may receive a high-level position in the administration if
the candidate wins, they can also be ostracized if the candidate loses. The political elite are
incentivized to pick candidates that will win and best represent the party.
The Democratic National Committee is the epitome of the political elite. The group is
composed of 200 chairs and vice-chairs chosen by primary voters or a state’s Democratic Party’s
central committee.28 The group coordinates the party’s official platform and policy goals. In
addition, it controls the party’s official financing and the primary convention. After the
convention, the party works with the nominee to raise funds, commission polls and establish a
campaign strategy. The DNC, however, is supposed to remain neutral until the convention.
Nevertheless, elites in the DNC exert their will on the presidential election process by setting
nomination rules and requirements.
Seniors officials create procedures that benefit their desired nominee and that hurt
outsiders. For example, all DNC members exert power during the convention as super delegates.
Super delegates can pledge support to their desired candidate at the party’s presidential

26

Cohen, Marty. The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations before and after Reform.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.
27
Anderson, Christopher L. “Which Party Elites Choose to Lead the Nomination
Process?” Political Research Quarterly 66, no. 1 (2013): 61-76. Accessed February 18, 2020.
28
“The Charter and Bylaws of the Democratic Party of the United States,” 2018.
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convention. These unelected and unpledged delegates make up 15% of the total delegate count.29
In 2016, these delegates were critical for Hillary Clinton’s victory over Bernie Sanders. Clinton,
who had support from the party elite, had a significant advantage. The DNC changed the rules in
2020 to allow super delegates to vote only if there is no winner after the first ballot at the
convention.30 Sanders complained that it was unfair for super delegates to influence the
nomination process because they are supposed to be neutral.31 Moreover, he alleged that super
delegates take away from the democratic nature of the primary process. The 2020 super delegate
rule change demonstrates how the party elite influences the nomination process. While the DNC
changed the super delegates rules, they also made other rules changes, like the strict debate
requirements, that were intended to favor more establishment candidates.
In addition to the party elite, the media plays a large role in the primary process. Geer et
al find that it is often difficult for voters to differentiate primary candidates on major policy
issues.32 Thus, primary candidates organize their campaigns in a manner that increases their
media coverage.33 The media educates voters on differences in primary candidates in two major
ways. First, media outlets educate voters through news reports and commentary. Second,
candidates use the media to speak directly to voters through advertisements and interviews. Per

29

Ibid.
Levy, Adam. “DNC Changes Superdelegate Rules in Presidential Nomination
Process.” CNN, Cable News Network, 25 Aug. 2018,
www.cnn.com/2018/08/25/politics/democrats-superdelegates-voting-changes/index.html.
31
Strauss, Daniel, et al. “Sanders Supporters Revolt against Superdelegates.” POLITICO,
14 Feb. 2016, www.politico.com/story/2016/02/bernie-sanders-superdelegates-democrats219286.
32
Geer, John, Richard Lau, David Nickerson, and Lynn Vavreck. "Advertising in an Era
of Choice." manuscript. Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions at Vanderbilt University
(2012).
33
Aldrich, John H. “A Dynamic Model of Presidential Nomination
Campaigns.” American Political Science Review 74, no. 3 (1980): 651–69.
30
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DeFleur’s media dependency theory, the media plays a substantial role in altering an audience’s
beliefs, behaviors and feelings.34 Thus, it is important for primary candidates to get media
coverage. The coverage can help a candidate spread their message and increase their name
recognition. Debates and post-debate coverage give candidates access to critical media attention.
The media also creates momentum during the campaign. In their book, Media and
Momentum, Orren and Polsby emphasize the bandwagon effect whereby “a candidate portrayed
in the media as viable and as improving begins to attract more and more support.”35 Positive
media coverage of early winners contributes to a voter’s awareness and perception of
candidates.36 Debate media coverage gives candidates the opportunity to expand their base and
demonstrate their qualifications, character and viability.
Primary debates also help to inform the public about where the candidates stand on the
issues. Benoit et al determine that “primary debates increase issue knowledge, influence
perceptions of candidates’ character, and can alter voter preferences.”37 These effects are larger
in primary debates, largely because the candidates are less well-known to voters, so their
attitudes are more pliable and susceptible to persuasion. Best and Hubbard reach similar
conclusions on the impact of primary debates. The authors conclude that “televised primary

34

Ball-Rokeach, S.J., and M.L. DeFleur. “A Dependency Model of Mass-Media
Effects.” Communication Research 3, no. 1 (January 1976): 3–21.
35
Gary R. Orren and Nelson W. Polsby, Media and Momentum: the New Hampshire
Primary and Nomination Politics (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1987), p.6
36
John G. Geer, Nominating Presidents (New York: Greenwood, 1989); Scott Keeter and
Cliff Zukin, Uniformed Choice: The Failure of the New Presidential Nominating System (New
York: Praeger, 1983); Thomas E. Patterson, The Mass Media Election: How Americans Choose
Their President (New York: Praeger, 1980).
37
Benoit et al., The Primary Decision, 344, 346; Kendall, Communication in Presidential
Primaries, 88.
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debates can exercise considerable influence on voter preferences.”38 After being exposed to
primary debates, voters increase their political engagement and will use debate performance to
evaluate candidates. Americans that do not watch the debates are less knowledgeable and less
willing to evaluate candidates. Finally, the authors note that Americans are more likely to change
their policy views after watching a debate.39 By learning about the policy views and arguments
of different candidates, Americans become more open to change.
Since a voter watching the debate becomes more willing to change their views, a solid
debate performance is extremely important to candidates. Viewers may alter their views to match
that of a candidate who performed exceptionally well on the debate stage. Moreover, the rising
number of debates gives voters more opportunities to change their minds. Thus, primary debates
are increasingly important in determining the eventual nominee.
It is critically important for candidates to try to make the debate stage. If a candidate
cannot make the debate, they cannot get the boost their campaign may need to attract a wider
audience. Subsequently, they will not rise in the polls and it will be difficult for them to raise
more money. Those that are not allowed on the debate stage face a downward spiral that is
difficult to escape. Therefore, candidates clearly make it a priority to make the campaign stage.

Historical Analysis
Presidential primary debates have become a common tool for voters and candidates in the
nomination process. The history of primary debates is surprisingly longer than that of general

38

Best, Samuel, and Clark Hubbard. “The Role of Televised Debates in the Presidential
Nomination Process.” In In Pursuit of the White House 2000. New York: Chatham House, 2000,
278.
39
Ibid.
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election debates. In fact, since 1976 every presidential primary cycle has featured at least two
debates. These events are highly publicized and routinely draw millions of viewers.40 Yet, it is
unclear how the debate participants were chosen and thus afforded the privilege to speak to these
viewers and gain free media coverage.
As debates have become more important, so have debate requirements. Making the
debate stage can be key to fundraising and garnering new supporters. Thus, media outlets and
parties need to make difficult decisions regarding debate inclusion. Pew’s Chartable Trust’s
“Report of the Task Force on Campaign Reform” sums up the problem:
“Perhaps the most consequential decision that must be made by any debate
sponsor is which candidates should be invited to participate. Here, we see a
powerful tension between the competing values of inclusiveness and
coherence. On one hand, providing access to minor-party and independent
candidates may stimulate interest in the campaign and inject new issues and
ideas into the debate. That is all good. On the other hand, participation by
minor candidates may reduce and fragment the time and attention available to
the major candidates, diluting their best opportunity to convey their
perspectives and proposals to the electorate.”41
Before 1972, the primary process was entirely controlled by elites and the party.
The Frazier-McGovern reforms democratized the process and rewarded candidates that
had run successful campaigns. After the reforms, the elite and the DNC struggled to

40

Ibid, 255.
“New Realities, New Thinking”: Report of the Task Force on Campaign Finance
Reform. PS: Political Science and Politics 30, no. 3 (1997): 487-89.
41
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influence the nomination process. The DNC wanted to prevent the rise of outsider
candidates and let the invisible primary do its job. In the primary cycles prior to 2020, it
became clear to officials that they could use the primary debates to winnow candidates.
After the GOP 2016 primary debate debacle and complaints about media sponsors and
candidates during the Democratic primary debates, the DNC decided to create
comprehensive debate qualification. The DNC could reassert its influence and winnow
the field with its own rules while appearing to remain impartial.

Debates from 1956-1976
The first Democratic primary debate took place in 1956 between Estes Kefauver and
Adlai Stevenson. During the 1960, 1968, 1972 and 1976 cycles there were a total of ten primary
debates and each debate had an average of 3.2 candidates on the stage. The primaries and
primary debates themselves were not determinative of the overall result. During the 1950s,
William Carleton notes that an “astute politician [could] reach the presidency merely by the quiet
search for delegates and the lining up of congress local leaders and bosses.”42 This was the era of
the smoke-filled conference room where Democratic congressional leaders would meet to decide
their party’s nominee. While the debates contributed to voters’ assessment of the candidates, it
played almost no role in determining the eventual nominee.
The Frazier-McGovern reforms, instituted in 1971, forced party elite to accept the
nomination of those that had run successful national pre-convention campaigns.43 The reforms
occurred after what Cohen calls “the outrageous nomination of Herbert Humphrey.”44 Humphrey

42

Carleton, William G. “The Revolution in the Presidential Nominating
Convention.” Political Science Quarterly 72, no. 2 (1957): 227.
43
Ibid.
44
Cohen, 3.
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did not participate in any of the primary debates and did not run on the ballot in any of the ten
primary states. The Democratic president, Lyndon Johnson, did not want George McGovern or
Eugene McCarthy, the two candidates on the ballot, to win the nomination because they were
against the Vietnam War. Instead, a pro-war Humphrey won the nomination at the convention by
garnering support form party bosses.45 The Frazier-McGovern reforms were agreed to by the
DNC after the nomination. The rules took power away from the political elite and ensured that
party bosses could not hand-pick nominees. The reforms required states to hold primary elections
to select which delegates would be sent to the party convention. Each state was allocated
delegates based on their state’s population. The reforms made campaigns and winning primary
elections more important.

Primary Debate Qualification 1984-2004
The Democratic primary debate qualifications continued to be unimportant from 1984 to
2004. The number of established candidates vying for their party’s nomination in each cycle in
this period was under ten. There was no need for a multi-night debate, nor strict debate
requirements.
In 1984, the Democratic party decided to increase the number of primary debates from
three to ten. The first debate was held that year in Hanover, New Hampshire and included eight
candidates. This was the most candidates the Democrats would have on one debate stage until
the first debate in 2004. The first debate in 1984 occurred just days before the New Hampshire
primary. At the time, the debates did not play a role in the winnowing process because none of
the candidates were excluded from the stage. Instead, candidates dropped out after they fell
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behind in the delegate count. By the seventh debate, which occurred after Super Tuesday, there
were only three candidates left on the stage. In 1984, the winnowing on the debate stage occurred
after the candidates began to lose delegates, not because they were excluded from the debate.
Thus, candidate qualifications for the debates during the 1984 primary were not significant.
The Democratic debate qualifications in 1988, 1992 and 2000 were also not critical and
did not impact the winnowing process. There was a total of 37 debates between these three
primary cycles and each debate had an average of 3.8 candidates. In 1988, the debate schedule
was moved forward. Instead of starting in January of the election year, it started in August of the
year before. Nevertheless, the original seven candidates participated in most of the debates until
Super Tuesday. After Super Tuesday, the number of candidates dropped to three. Like 1984,
most of the candidates waited until after Super Tuesday to drop out of the race based on their
delegate count. Again, failing to meet debate qualifications does not appear to contribute to
dropping out of the race. In 1992 and 2000, the same phenomenon is apparent. The 1992 primary
cycle had six candidates on the stage after New Hampshire. After Super Tuesday, the field
winnowed to three. In 2000, there were only two candidates on the debate stage, Senator Bill
Bradley of New Jersey and former Vice President Al Gore of Tennessee. During this primary
cycle neither candidate dropped out prior to the convention. It is clear from these historical
examples that losing state primary elections was the determining factor in dropping out of the
race not participation in the debates. During this period, debate qualification did not play a role
in the nomination process.
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2004 Debates
The 2004 Democratic debates featured an unprecedented number of candidates. The first
debate in September 2003 included nine candidates, including Vermont governor Howard Dean,
North Carolina Senator John Edwards, House minority leader Richard Gephardt, Florida Senator
Bob Graham, Massachusetts Senator John Kerry, Ohio Representative Dennis Kucinich,
Connecticut Senator Joe Lieberman, Illinois Senator Carol Mosely-Braun and the Reverend Al
Sharpton. Again, the debate requirements were not impactful in the winnowing of the candidates.
Seven candidates were on the debate stage before the New Hampshire and South Carolina
primaries. By Super-Tuesday on March 2nd, there were only four candidates left. The debate
requirements in this campaign did not exclude candidates, rather candidates were dropping out
on their own after they failed to accumulate delegates.
There was another factor at play in the winnowing process during the 2004 debates:
front-loading. In the 2004 primaries, the DNC and state parties decided to schedule all the
primaries within several weeks of each other.46 Previously, candidates had several weeks
between primaries, allowing them time to campaign in each state. In 2004, it was difficult for
candidates to effectively communicate their positions to voters in many states. In addition, the
candidates were forced to be strategic with their limited funds and were unable to campaign
widely or advertise effectively in each state. The DNC justified the front-loaded schedule by
claiming “the most important part of any primary schedule is that it needs to identify a strong
Democratic nominee early and lead to a Democratic victory in the general.”47 Busch and Mayer
find the schedule put pressure on non-front runners by making it difficult to retain a reliable flow
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of campaign funds.48 Second, they conclude the schedule increased the organizational demands
on non-front runner candidates. The changes pushed six out of nine candidates out of the race by
mid-February. Here, the debates did not put pressure on candidates, but rather the primary
schedule did.

2008 Debates: Debate Requirements Matter
In the 2008 Democratic primary cycle, the debate qualifications became more important
in the winnowing process. This cycle featured an unprecedented 20 debates, four more than
2004. There were eight candidates on the stage in Orangeburg, South Carolina for the first debate
in April of 2007. In December, there were six candidates and after the New Hampshire primary
there were only four candidates. Unlike previous years, two semi-major candidates, Dennis
Kucinich and Mike Gravel, were excluded from the debates prior to the first caucus in Iowa
because of differing debate qualifications imposed by media outlets in New Hampshire and
Nevada. The debates qualifications played a significant role in winnowing the field. Moreover, it
was not the DNC excluding the candidates, but rather the media outlets that arranged the debates.
The exclusion of the two candidates and the media’s role in the debates represents a dramatic
shift in the primary debate system.
Starting in September of 2007, six months before Iowa, media outlets were trying to
exclude Dennis Kucinich from participating in the Democratic debates. Kucinich was the Mayor
of Cleveland and a former congressman from Ohio. He ran for the Democratic nomination in
2004 and dropped out in March. While he was included in all the debates during the 2004 cycle,
he frequently criticized the news media for not covering him. He condemned ABC News for
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removing a reporter that was following his campaign. ABC responded by claiming they were
focusing more viable candidates.49 A similar trend followed his candidacy in 2008.
Early in the 2008 nomination process, media outlets sought to exclude the former
congressman. In an unsanctioned debate hosted by AARP in New Hampshire on September 20th,
2007, Kucinich was excluded for not meeting the debate requirements. AARP claimed that he
had not met their debate standard by failing to have an “Iowa campaign office and the
employment of an Iowa campaign staff representative by no later than August 1, 2007.”50
Kucinich had an office in the state, but it was run out of a friend’s house and did not meet
AARP’s requirements.51 The same requirements were used for the Des Moines Register debate
on December 13th. Again, Kucinich was excluded because the organizers concluded “that a
person working out of his home did not meet our criteria for a campaign office and full-time paid
staff in Iowa.”52 In another debate, ABC News decided to exclude him “because [he] did not
place first through fourth in Iowa, poll 5 percent or higher in one of the last four major New
Hampshire surveys, or poll 5 percent or higher in one of the last four major national surveys.”53
Although these debates were weeks before the first caucus in Iowa, media outlets were
attempting to exclude Kucinich.
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The last straw for Dennis Kucinich was being disinvited from the NBC Las Vegas debate
on January 15th, 2008. NBC changed the requirements to prevent him from appearing. At first, he
was included in the debate because he had averaged three to four percent support in recent
Nevada polls.54 NBC changed the criteria to include only candidates who had placed first, second
or third in either the Iowa caucuses or New Hampshire primaries.55 He sued NBC in Nevada
claiming that NBC was infringing on his first amendment right to free speech. He complained
that NBC was attempting to muzzle a “candidate who has duly qualified to participate in the
political process in violation of the prior offer to allow the participation.”56 To his chagrin, the
Supreme Court of Nevada ruled against him. His campaign failed to meet the standard of
irreparable harm. The court ruled that NBC is a private company and there was no contract that
guaranteed Kucinich’s participation. Kucinich’s exclusion from the debates before and after the
first primaries demonstrate the media’s attempt to control the nomination process. After missing
the next four debates and failing to accumulate delegates or funding, Kucinich dropped out of the
race. He was not the only the candidate during the 2004 Democratic primaries to be excluded
from debates before Iowa.
Mike Gravel was also excluded from debates before the first primary. Gravel is a former
Senator from Alaska and is famous for reading the Pentagon Papers on the floor of the Senate in
1971. Media outlets first tried to exclude Gravel from the debate stage in July 2007, four months
before Iowa. CNN and YouTube, the debate organizers, claimed that their “criteria simply
identifies candidates that have measurable public support for their campaign. Because Mike
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Gravel has not demonstrated measurable public support for his campaign to date, he has not
received an invitation.”57 After complaining about the decision, Gravel participated in the eight
candidate CNN debate. On August 7th, Gravel was yet again excluded from a debate for not
filling out a questionnaire that the host, AFL-CIO, required.58 On August, 9th, Gravel was not
invited to the LGBT Network debate because he failed to meet the $100,000 fundraising
threshold.59 After arguing against the unfair requirement, claiming it limited free speech, they
allowed him to participate.60 The LGBT Network’s requirement marks the first time that
fundraising was used as a debate requirement for Democratic candidates. On October 30th,
Gravel was excluded from an NBC debate because he had not “campaigned in New
Hampshire and/or Iowa at least 14 times in the past year, did not poll high enough in national
polls and had not raised more than US$1 million.”61 Upon this news, a hedge fund manager
famously donated $1 million to Gravel’s campaign.62 Nonetheless, he was not included. Gravel
left the Democratic party in March of 2008 to run for the nomination as a Libertarian.
The campaigns of Gravel and Kucinich demonstrate the power of the media and the
importance of consistent debate qualifications. Both candidates were excluded from debates.
They argued against the decisions, understanding the importance of debates in creating campaign
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momentum. Moreover, the inconsistent and seemingly arbitrary requirements of 2008 were a
signal to the Democratic party that changes needed to be made. The media had demonstrated it
had too much control over the process and the party realized it had too little. These 2008 debate
qualifications troubles compounded with the GOP’s chaotic debate stages in 2016, made it clear
to senior DNC officials that they needed to make a change.

2008, 2012 and 2016 Debates: A Lesson from the GOP
The 2008 GOP primary debates were equally as inconsistent as those of the Democrats in
2008. The GOP had 20 debates from May 2007 to February 2008. In Intraparty Democracy and
the 2016 Election, Julia Azari and Seth Masket find only three instances during that time in
which the debate requirements were clearly enumerated. The second debate, which occurred in
May, required a threshold of one percent in South Carolina and national polls.63 A businessman,
named John Cox, sued Fox Broadcasting Network for excluding him from the debate. A judge
later ruled that free speech rights did not apply because a primary debate is not a public forum.64
This was the same argument used by the Supreme Court of Nevada to exclude Kucinich. Ron
Paul, a Texas congressmen, was also excluded from a Fox News debate before the New
Hampshire primary. Paul performed well in Iowa and his campaign had succeeded in its
fundraising efforts.65 With the respect to the 2008 GOP debates, Azari and Masket found that
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“the networks appear[ed] to have cherry-picked the polls it used, crafting criteria to exclude
specific candidates.”66
In 2012, the GOP attempted to reconcile the errors they made in 2008. Media outlets
created clearer standards for their debates. They included specific lists of polls that could be used
to qualify for debate inclusion.67 The GOP had nine candidates that made at least one of the
debates. Further, aside from Mitt Romney’s exclusion from the first debate and Jon Huntsman’s
exclusion from the second debate, the debate requirements were not a meaningful issue of the
primaries. While the 2012 debates were less contentious than 2008, 2016 would bring its own
host of problems.
The 2016 GOP primary debates were unlike any other in the country’s history. Expecting
many candidates, the GOP created a commission called the Growth and Opportunity Project that
was tasked with creating unilateral rules to govern the party’s primary debates.68 The
commission limited the number of party-sanctioned debates and prescribed the location of the
debates. The commission, however, did not establish rules for polling thresholds, leaving the
networks in charge of who could participate. Media outlets took it upon themselves to establish
more consistent debate qualifications. Since the GOP primaries had 21 candidates and twelve
debates, media outlets and the party wanted to create a fair process for debate invitations. The
GOP and their media partners accomplished this in two ways. First, the party featured undercarddebates for those who did not make the primetime debate stage. This gave lower-polling
longshot candidates the opportunity to present their ideas. Second, media outlets independently
created comprehensive rules for debate requirements. Due to the increased size of the field and
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the GOP’s intervention in the process, the 2016 GOP debates were the most procedurally
developed and consistent in primary history.69
Although the debate rules were consistent, the crowded field hurt the GOP’s ability to
control the outcome of the nomination. The invisible primary failed to produce an establishment
candidate. The top candidates in the early summer, which included Cruz, Bush, Kasich, Rubio
and Carson, had a similar number of endorsements and had accumulated comparable funds.70
The large field and lack of a clear establishment candidate worked in Donald Trump’s favor. The
first debate on August 6th featured two debates with a total of 20 candidates. The first included
the ten highest polling candidates, in order of their national polling averages.71 The under-card
debate originally had a 1% polling threshold that was later removed to allow three additional
candidates. In the September debate, a lack of polling allowed additional candidates to compete
in the under-card debate.72 A week before the first primary, the GOP was still using a two-debate
format featuring the eleven candidates in the race. After Iowa, the number of candidates allowed
on the primetime stage was reduced to seven.73 Regardless, the damage was done. Candidates
stayed in the race longer because they were making the debate stage in only the under-card stage.
Only half of the 20 original candidates dropped out before the Iowa caucuses. Although the GOP
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had created a consistent and developed debate process, an outsider still became the party
nominee. The large debate stage and Trump’s rise in the polls allowed him to qualify for the
debates and spread his message.
In 2016, the debates were chaotic and resulted in the opposite of what the GOP
establishment wanted. The political elite did not want Trump to be their party’s nominee and
believed he could not win. In Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for
the Meaning of America, John Sides, Lynn Vavreck, and Michael Tessler assess the media’s role
in Trump’s nomination. They found that Trump’s constant media presence and attentiongrabbing debate performances made up for his organizational short-falls.74 He received more
media coverage than the other candidates and did not pay a cent for it. The Democrats learned
from this experience. They wanted a consistent system like the GOP debates, but without an
extremist candidate on the ticket.

2016 Democratic Debates
The 2016 Democratic primary was the opposite of the GOP experience. The primaries
only contained a handful of candidates and featured a clear establishment candidate in Hillary
Clinton. Not only was she arguably the most experienced candidate to ever run for the position,
but also had a plethora of endorsements and a massive war chest. She won the invisible primary.
In addition, she benefitted from the support of super delegates, who represented 15% of the total
delegates at the convention.75 It was Hillary Clinton’s nomination to lose in 2016.
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Nonetheless, she faced four other candidates in the first debate, including Vermont
Senator Bernie Sanders, Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley, Virginia Senator Jim Webb and
Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Chafee. The Democratic debates originally only featured six
debates, minimizing the likelihood a non-establishment candidate would have a breakout debate
performance. The first debate in October hosted by CNN required candidates to have 1% or more
support in three or more national polls.76 Lawrence Lessig, a law professor at Harvard, running
for President was not invited to any of the debates for failing to register any support. Many saw
his candidacy as perfunctory and considered his absence as uncontroversial.77 By the next debate
in November, Chafee and Webb had both dropped out. Both of their campaigns failed to
accumulate momentum. Martin O’Malley, the former Governor of Maryland, was almost left off
the fourth debate in January for failing to reach 5% nationally.78 He complained that “this
election is not up to NBC executives, not up to pollsters, its up to you, the people of Iowa.”79 He
was later allowed on the debate stage after the chair of the party intervened on Twitter, writing
she expected to see all the candidates on the stage.80 After New Hampshire, O’Malley dropped
out leaving two candidates, Clinton and Sanders. The party also effectively got rid of
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unsanctioned debates by refusing to give delegates to candidates that participated in them.81 This
ensured that candidate would comply with the party’s rules. While the debate rules were
consistent throughout the process, the DNC’s role in the primary process became a point of
contention.
The 2016 primaries left the Sanders campaign fuming. Although Hillary Clinton won the
nomination on the first ballot, accumulating 54% of the total pledged delegates, Sanders alleged
the DNC was working against him.82 First, his campaign complained that the lack of debates
prevented Sanders from getting his name out. The DNC added three more debates after Senator
Sanders became more relevant and complained. There were five debates that featured only
Sanders and Clinton. While the GOP had twelve in 2016, the Democrats only had nine. His
campaign also complained that the debates were on Saturday nights when people are out or
watching sporting events The GOP debates in 2016 were on weekday nights. Third, they
complained about the super delegate rules that supported Clinton. 83 Leaked emails from Debbie
Wasserman Shultz, the chair of the DNC, only reinforced Bernie’s campaign theories. The
emails revealed that Ms. Shultz questioned Sanders’ commitment to the party, claiming he
speaks like “someone who has never been a member of the Democratic Party and has no
understanding of what we do.”84 There is also evidence a Clinton lawyer advised the DNC on
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how to deal with Sanders and created a narrative that Sanders never had an organized campaign.
The complaints against the DNC and leaked emails required them to act to ensure a fairer
nomination process for 2020.

The 2020 Debates
Prior to 2020, the Democratic primary debate qualification rules were inconsistent. The
requirements for some debates were set by the media outlet hosting them. In other instances, the
DNC intervened, setting their own guidelines. In addition, the requirements varied by debate. In
the 2008 cycle, some debates required a candidate to have a campaign staff in early primary
voting states to qualify, while other debates relied simply on polling numbers. The
inconsistencies frustrated candidates that were left off the stage, many of whom argued the rules
were unclear and harmed their candidacy. In February of 2019, the DNC created a unilateral set
of rules for its primary debates and made an unprecedented decision to create a new system for
debate qualification. In addition to needing a minimum percentage in national and state polls,
candidates were incentivized to raise money from as many Americans as possible. I hypothesize
that these prior inconsistencies pushed the Democrats to create comprehensive debate
requirements. Moreover, I believe the decision allows the party to create rules that work in their
favor rather than in the favor of media outlets.
By taking the debate threshold out of the hands of media outlets, and setting them for
themselves, the DNC works to reassert its power in the process. The requirements, which are the
strictest in primary debate history, were created with the intent to winnow the field quickly. The
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DNC did not want as many under-card debates as the Republicans had in 2016. As such,
candidates that failed to meet the progressively strict requirements will be forced to drop out of
the race. Not making the debate makes it harder for candidates to raise money and garner media
attention. The strict debate requirements also make it difficult for long-shot candidates to gain
momentum. This further ensures that an establishment candidate will win the party’s nominee.

Background on the 2020 Decision
In 2017, Tom Perez was elected by the senior members of the DNC, in part to lead the
nomination process. His qualifications were impressive, serving as the Secretary of Labor and
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights under President Obama. Perez outlined his party’s
goals for the 2020 presidential election. Perez made it a priority to improve the debate structure
of his party. In a press release, Perez announced his goals, stating that he wanted to “give the
grassroots a bigger voice than ever before; showcase [Democratic] candidates on an array of
media platforms; present an opportunity for vigorous discussion about issues, ideas and
solutions; and reach as many potential voters as possible.”85 In addition, Perez wanted a
nomination process that could handle a large primary field and winnow it quickly. He noted that
he was a not a fan of under-card debates and wanted a discussion of substantive issues instead of
“debates about hand-size,” referring to the 2016 GOP primary debates.86
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Perez had a little over a year to create rules that aligned with his agenda. Media reports
claim that DNC officials created a committee that met 80 to 100 times to discuss the debate
structure.87 The most difficult decision was how to create new debate qualifying requirements.
Several options were presented. They could use the minimum polling percentage they had used
in 2016. Second, they considered requiring candidates to have a certain number of paid staffers
in early primary states. Third, they considered adding a fundraising component and requiring
candidates to raise a minimum amount of money or have a minimum number of donors. They
spoke with former candidates and campaign managers and conducted research to make their
decision.88 The criteria were announced in February 2019:
Democratic candidates may qualify for the first and second debate by meeting
one of the two following sets of criteria:
Polling Method: Register 1% or more support in three polls (which may be
national polls, or polls in Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and/or
Nevada) publicly released between January 1, 2019, and 14 days prior to the
date of the Organization Debate… Any candidate’s three qualifying polls must
be conducted by different organizations, or if by the same organization, must
be in different geographical areas.
Grassroots Fundraising Method. Candidates may qualify for the debate by
demonstrating that the campaign has received donations from at least (1)
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65,000 unique donors; and (2) a minimum of 200 unique donors per state in at
least 20 U.S. states. To demonstrate that the fundraising threshold has been
reached, candidates must provide verifiable evidence, which they may do by
authorizing ActBlue and/or NGP VAN to provide that evidence.
If more than 20 candidates qualify for the debate, the top 20 candidates will be
selected using a methodology that gives primacy to candidates meeting both
thresholds, followed by the highest polling average, followed by the most
unique donors.89
In May 2019, the DNC announced they were going to use similar criteria for the third and
fourth debates. The polling requirement was increased to 2% and the grassroots fundraising
threshold increased to 130,000 donors with at least 400 unique donors in at least twenty states.90
In September, the DNC announced a change to the polling requirements for the fifth and sixth
debates. Candidates needed either four polls above 4% or two polls above 5% in early states.91
The DNC wanted to incentivize candidates to focus on early states. In addition, the grassroots
fundraising threshold increased to 165,000 donors and 600 unique donors in at least 20 states.92
The seventh debate further increased the standards for polling and fundraising.93 The eighth
debate rules are like the seventh, except for the added provision that all candidates that gain one
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pledged delegate in the Iowa caucus automatically qualify.94 Delegates in Iowa are only awarded
to candidates that garner more than 15% of the final vote. The ninth and tenth debates are similar
to the eighth, but remove the fundraising threshold.95 Finally, the eleventh debate requires
candidates to have at least 20% of the pledged delegates awarded by March 15th to qualify.96 The
DNC has not yet announced the rules for a possible twelfth debate.
The number of donors was decided in consultation with ActBlue. ActBlue is campaign
fundraising website that makes it easy for people to donate to their candidate of choice. The site
keeps a donor’s disclosure documents and credit card on file. The DNC decided the number of
donors by working with the site and consultants who analyzed historical donor trends from the
2016 election and FEC disclosures from Congressional elections. Those that made the decisions
asserted that it was the best way to meet their grassroots goal. Tom Perez believes that “if you
want to be president of the United States, you have to develop a proficiency at grassroots
fundraising.”97 Thus, he dubbed it the grassroots fundraising threshold. It incentivizes campaigns
to build their fundraising infrastructure. A candidate that is not necessarily polling well early, but
is developing their fundraising techniques will benefit from the donor requirement. Moreover,
Perez hopes that it will help the DNC in the general election. This large base of donors may not
only donate in the general election, but also may volunteer or participate in other ways to support
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the Democrats. By encouraging donations of any size, Perez wanted to encourage as many
people as possible to participate in politics.
After the decision was made there was pushback from campaigns and pundits. Michael
Bennett, who qualified for the first two debates and failed to qualify for the subsequent three
debates, believes the DNC has mixed priorities. The DNC should not “be favoring national
fundraising and cable television over the early states like New Hampshire.”98 A senior Democrat
campaign advisor shares Bennett’s view. It forces candidates to choose “between focusing on
Iowa or New Hampshire or focusing on making these national requirements.”99 These comments
were made before the early state polling criteria for debate five and six. Some have also
complained about the lack of transparency in the process. They argue that the new criteria were
released without consulting candidates or middle to lower level DNC officials. The resistance to
the change prompted the need for a thorough analysis on the decision to include strict
requirements.
The debate requirements announced by the DNC for 2020 were the result of several
conflicting incentives. First, the Democrats did not want ten candidates going into Iowa. The
DNC, under the direction of Tom Perez, wanted to sufficiently winnow the field before the first
primary. Less candidates translates into a shorter primary season and an increased focus on the
general. He also wanted to avoid a repeat of the GOP’s process where a long-shot candidate was
nominated as Trump had been in 2016. He expected a big primary field for 2020 with candidates
looking to raise their profile and defeat a widely unpopular incumbent. He wanted a barrier to
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entry that “was not a layup, but also not a half-court shot.”100 Second, he wanted to prevent any
suspicion that the party favored one candidate over another. The DNC needed to respond to the
previous complaints from O’Malley and Sanders. The party wanted candidates to believe it had
taken its foot off the scale with consistent qualification thresholds set by the party, not
independent media outlets. Only the DNC could control this vital responsibility. The DNC had to
weigh its internal desire to the control the outcome of the process, while appearing to be
impartial. The untested 2020 requirements were created to remedy these conflicting interests.

Discussion
Hypothesis One: The DNC changed the criteria to combat the rise in the number of candidates
The increasing number of candidates in modern primaries particularly the GOP’s 2016
primary is one reason why the Democrats instituted strict debate rules for 2020. There were a
total of twenty-nine major Democratic presidential candidates vying for their party’s nomination
in 2020, eight more than the GOP in 2016. The unprecedented number of candidates required a
comprehensive system for winnowing. Thus, the DNC turned to debate rules. Those that failed to
make the debate stage were likely to experience a drop in poll numbers and poor fundraising
causing them to end their candidacy. The stricter requirements would also speed up the
winnowing process, forcing voters to choose from a handful of candidates as opposed to over
twenty-five.
In the history of Democratic presidential debates, the largest number of candidates that
had appeared on a debate stage was ten in 2004. Still, the 2004 primaries did not host an
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undercard debate. In addition, the Democrats and media outlets have allowed most major
candidates, with some exceptions in 2008, to compete in the debates up until the first primary. In
2008, Gravel and Kucinich were excluded from early debates because they failed to meet some
aspects of the debate requirements. While some of the rules seemed arbitrary, their campaigns
failed to gain traction. Both were outsider candidates that lacked formal campaign organizations
in many early primary states. The 2020 campaign was a new test for Democrats. They could no
longer rely on media outlets and candidates voluntarily dropping out to winnow the field.
Instead, they decided to use debate requirements.
In anticipation of more candidates in 2020 than 2016, the DNC announced the rule
changes in February, before most candidates had officially announced their candidacy. Potential
Democratic candidates had three major incentives to run in 2020. First, there was no clear
favorite in the race as there was in 2016, despite Vice President Joe Biden’s, Senator Corey
Booker’s and Senator Bernie Sanders’ early endorsements and fundraising. Second, as more
candidates entered the race, a candidate on the edge became more likely to run. With twenty
candidates already in the race, the so-called marginal candidate had little to lose by joining the
race. Third, all the Democratic candidates believed that they could beat Trump. Since Hillary
Clinton, an establishment candidate lost in 2016, many non-establishment candidates joined the
race to offer an alternative. Their campaigns appealed to voters by claiming Democrats needed a
new approach to beating Trump. The confluence of these factors meant that the DNC knew they
were going to see more candidates in 2020 and needed a method for quickly winnowing the
field.
The stricter debate rules change forced candidates to continually reassess their campaigns
long-term viability. Even before the first primary, candidates face decisions on whether to
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remain in the race. Prior to the rule change in 2020, low-polling candidates could hope for a
breakout debate performance to increase their name recognition and fundraising efforts. This
process has sped up and longshot candidates now have a limited number of attempts to have an
outstanding debate performance.
Regardless of when a candidate drops out of the race, the decision-making process is the
same. Norrander’s comprehensive study analyzes presidential primaries from 1980 to 2004.
Those dropping out after the first primary are considering initial assets and characteristics
(national poll standings, fund-raising totals and occupational background), initial contest
outcomes (Iowa and New Hampshire) and structural variables (proportional representation
delegate distribution rules, party, front-loaded calendar).101 Besides the New Hampshire and
Iowa results, her duration model predicts that poll standings, occupational background and
funding shaped the length of a candidates bid for the nomination.102 The long primary season
with stricter and stricter debate requirements makes candidates constantly rethink their
candidacy. Moreover, without access to debates, candidates face difficulties increasing their
polling and fundraising efforts. The new debate thresholds and failure to make the debate stage
make it harder for candidates to justify their campaign.

Hypothesis Two: Change in Democratic requirements due to previous inconsistencies
Another reason the DNC changed the debate requirements for 2020 was because they
wanted to establish consistent requirements. The inconsistencies in 2008 and 2012 created
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confusion and avenues of attack for candidates that missed the debate thresholds. The
Democrats’ rules build upon the Republican’s attempt in 2016. The Democrats wanted unilateral
control over the entire process, to ensure fair and comprehensive debate rules.
Prior to 2008, the Democratic debate requirements were not meant to exclude candidates.
Most candidates made the debate stage and dropped out of the race after the first primaries, not
after failing to make a debate. In 2008, however, inconsistencies in the debate rules led to
multiple complaints. When Gravel and Kucinich were excluded in December of 2007, the two
candidates gained media attention for their legal battles and put the party in a difficult position.
The party did not want it to appear like they were excluding candidates and stifling the process.
However, they also did not want to give a voice to candidates that were unlikely to garner
delegates in the primaries and would more likely take attention from the individual who would in
fact be the Democratic nominee. Furthermore, at the time it was not the parties making the
decisions, but rather media outlets. The 2008 debate cycle was a signal to Democrats that their
process needed to be reformed.
In 2016, the Democrats only had six candidates on the first debate stage. Nonetheless,
Martin O’Malley complained about being excluded from a debate after the New Hampshire
primary. He was later allowed to participate, despite failing to meet the requirements. In the
same cycle, the GOP created the most comprehensive rules in their history. The DNC recognized
it needed its own comprehensive system to account for the large number of candidates. The
Democrats, under the direction of Tom Perez, created the new system for 2020. With the new
rules, candidates would no longer be able to complain about lack of clarity or inconsistencies in
debate rules.
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Hypothesis Three: Democrats want more control over setting rules, taking it away from the
media
Before 2020, neither major party had control over who made the primary debate stage.
The criteria were set by media outlets and candidates who were excluded channeled their
complaints toward the party. Due to the inconsistent rules among the major media outlets, the
Democrats needed to intervene. Since the media and the DNC do not have the same incentives
regarding primary debate system, the DNC believed it was necessary to take unilateral control.
In the United States, media outlets are run as a for-profit business. Newspapers, cable and
online news outlets profit from viewership and advertising revenue. In fact, the revenue of major
media outlets is cyclical and rises and falls with election years.103 For the largest media
companies, debates often give them their highest viewership numbers of the year. The first
Democratic debate in 2020 had 15.3 million viewers on the first night and 18.1 million viewers
on the second night.104 This beats the previous primary debate record-holder made in 2015. For
comparison, the most watched news program in October 2019 was Hannity on Fox News and it
had 3.5 million viewers per night.105
These primary events are highly publicized and lead the headlines. A debate that creates
headlines leads to more views, more expensive advertising slots and subsequently more profit.
One journalist notes that “the high [debate] viewership is likely to turbocharge an already
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significant investment in political coverage, which has pushed up revenues and ratings.”106 Thus,
the outlet that has the privilege of holding the debate has an incentive to increase viewership.
While the business office of most major media outlets does not explicitly tell their debate staff to
create a spectacle, a non-controversial debate is not in their best interest. Controversy is linked to
clicks, views and profit. Media outlets must weigh this with their desire to seem like they are
impartial. Otherwise, the outlet may lose their ability to host debates in the future and viewers
will not consider them trustworthy. In 2013, the GOP announced that it would prohibit CNN and
NBC from hosting the Republican 2016 presidential primary debates.107 The GOP alleged that
outlets were “undermining the perceived objectivity of the coverage of the 2016 presidential
campaign.”108 The GOP noted that these two news outlets had a pro-Democrat agenda in the
2012 election, claiming they were trying to appeal to their liberal viewers. Media outlets try to
increase viewership and profit, while also trying to stay impartial and maintain the right to host
debates.
In addition to trying to increase viewership and appearing impartial, media outlets want
to host a meaningful debate to educate potential voters on the candidates. While media outlets
want voters to make an informed decision, they must also grapple with the fact that not all
candidates are equal. Why should a candidate polling with less than 5% favorability be allowed
to participate in a debate with candidates that have 20% favorability? Each media outlet solves
this problem differently. CNN reversed its decision to exclude Gravel in July, 2007, although he
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did not meet the requirements. In November 2007, CNN added a fundraising component, which
excluded him from the debate stage. NBC included all the candidates in their first debate in April
2007. In October, the company excluded Gravel in October for missing the fundraising
threshold. The changes in requirements were up to the discretion of the media outlets.
Nonetheless, candidates blamed both media companies and the party for failing to include them.
Many claimed that they were stifling free speech. To be more even-handed and give clarity to the
process, the DNC took unilateral control of the requirements for 2020.
Unlike the major media companies, the DNC is not driven by profit. It does not benefit
directly from the advertising revenue generated during debates, nor does it gain financially from
high viewership. A highly viewed debate in the eyes of the DNC helps the voters decide on their
candidate more quickly and encourages people to become more politically involved. The DNC
wants their debates to produce a favorite, educate voters and increase political activism.

Hypothesis Four: Democratic change created to streamline the process hurts long-shot candidates
There is no question that the new debate requirements were created to bring order to the
primary process. After the GOP in 2016, senior party officials recognized the need to be more
clear in their qualification thresholds. Moreover, the DNC’s control allows them to create
thresholds that align with meeting their goals. These goals are again to produce an electable
candidate and to create a strong organization for the general. The order created by the DNC,
however, comes at the cost of long-shot candidates that had previously been in the race until the
Iowa caucuses.
Prior to 2020, candidates allocated their resources in a manner that would increase their
chances of winning the nomination. Per Paul-Henri Gurian, there are two strategies for resource
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allocation in primaries that are determined by the competitiveness of the candidate.109 Long-shot
candidates try to develop momentum by allocating their resources in early primaries, which are
expected to be covered extensively by the media. On the other hand, established candidates will
focus on garnering the largest number of delegates to secure the nomination. Self-funded
candidates are excluded from this discussion because they are not constrained by a limited
amount of money.
In 2020, the long-shot candidates have unsurprisingly been the first to be excluded from
the debate stage. The DNC only featured two debates with two debate stages. Since the ABC
September debate, there have been a maximum of twelve candidates on the stage. The long-shot
candidates that have failed to garner material support include Julián Castro, Beto O’Rourke, Tim
Ryan, Bill de Blasio, Jay Inslee, Tim Ryan, Joe Sestak, Steve Bullock, John Hickenlooper and
Eric Swalwell. These candidates had dropped out of the race by December 2019, a month before
the first primary. Many of these candidates explicitly cited the heightened debate requirements in
describing their failure to gain momentum. In a fundraising email circulated in September, Beto
O’Rourke wrote it would be the “end of [his] campaign” if he did not qualify for the November
debate.110 Similarly, Bill de Blasio told CNN that “it's really tough to conceive of continuing” a
campaign without making the October debate.111 While the debate requirements are not entirely
to blame for their failures, they are consistently cited as hurting unlikely candidacies.
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The debate criteria rules will fundamentally alter the resource allocation of long-shot
candidates both staff wise and financially. Instead of focusing on winning, they must focus on
meeting the DNC’s strict debate thresholds. This is what led to Senator Gillibrand’s outrageous
t-shirt promotion on Facebook. Her campaign knew that failing to make the debate stage would
be the end of her campaign. She would not be considered viable if she did not make the stage.
No longer does failing to acquire delegates in Iowa winnow the field, instead the Democratic
debates do.

Conclusion
How do primary debate rules shape the contours of the process? Previous political science
literature on the primary process focuses on the role of parties and the elite, typically centering
on the invisible primary. Political communication scholars have researched general election
debates and the role of media and momentum in primary campaigns. However, there is no
existing literature on the importance of primary debate thresholds and the DNC’s 2020 criteria.
This thesis provides a contemporary analysis of primary debate requirements and their
importance in the nomination process. It outlines the responsibilities and incentives of parties,
media outlets and candidates. Furthermore, the historical analysis demonstrates how the debate
criteria have changed over time. The increased number of candidates, previous inconsistencies in
the requirements and media’s control of the debates have created numerous problems for the
DNC. More importantly, it made the DNC seem like it was not in control of the process and led
to accusations of bias. Thus, the DNC implemented comprehensive requirements for 2020. In
doing so, they created rules that would benefit the party and hurt long-shot candidates.
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The DNC’s new rules on primary debate requirements have a material impact on the
candidate selection process. On the one hand, the DNC must try to appease all the candidates and
avoid appearing biased toward establishment candidates. On the other hand, the DNC wants to
have a smooth process and prevent an unknown outsider candidate from taking over the party, as
Trump did to the GOP in 2016. The Democrats needed a mechanism to winnow candidates
quickly and prevent the rise of an outsider candidate. The Democrats wanted to appear
trustworthy and in-control in the eyes of the American people. The 2020 rules set out to
accomplish both goals. When they are attacked for being biased, the DNC has argued that the
rules have been in place for months and are consistent. Nonetheless, the rules are significantly
stricter than previous years and make it harder for disorganized candidates to make the stage.
The DNC is thus shaping the outcome, without appearing to do so.
In 2016, the Democratic party attempted to walk this tight-rope with Vermont Senator
Bernie Sanders in 2016. Sanders was the only candidate that could compete with Hillary Clinton
for the Democratic nomination. To the surprise of the DNC, his campaign became competitive,
relying on grassroots funding and organizing. The DNC did not want a self-identified
Democratic Socialist to represent the party. His stances differed staunchly from those in the
DNC’s party platform, which were agreed to at the party’s convention, and more aligned with
Clinton’s positions. Therefore, the DNC elite agreed to support Clinton at the party’s convention
in 2016. Nonetheless, the party also did not want to appear to be influencing the process. The
days of nominees being chosen by the political elite in smoke-filled conference rooms were over.
Emails released by WikiLeaks after the convention have confirmed some of the suspicions of the
Sanders campaign regarding the DNC’s objectivity. The DNC’s embarrassment when the emails
were revealed further underscored their need to appear impartial. The 2020 debate rules
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attempted to achieve the DNC’s objectives in controlling the primary field without appearing to
influence it.
While the rules are extremely detailed, they do not address all the DNC’s issues. For
example, the DNC will continue to rely on media outlets to commission the polls used for
polling thresholds. The DNC neither has the resources, nor the desire to invest in the resources to
conduct expensive and laborious polls. The 2020 debate requirements list the polling companies
that candidates can use to qualify for the debates.112 Media companies, however, do not only
conduct polls for the DNC. They are for-profit companies that issue polls that their company can
use on television and report on. This was a problem for Tom Perez in January, 2020 because
there were not enough polls commissioned that could help candidates qualify for the DNC
debates.113 Candidates Andrew Yang and Tom Steyer complained that they would not make the
debate due to the lack of polls performed between the end of December to early January. In
December, a DNC spokeswoman asked the “expansive list of 16 qualifying poll sponsors [to]
conduct more independent polling” that could be used as debate criteria.114 In this case, the DNC
is ceding authority to the media as a result of not owning the entire process. This is exactly what
the DNC wanted to prevent when they unilaterally created the debate rules without input or
alignment with the pollsters or media outlets.
In addition, the DNC never clarified how they would handle candidates that did not
conduct any fundraising. Billionaire Tom Steyer spent his own money to meet the DNC’s
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grassroots funding threshold.115 On the other hand, billionaire Michael Bloomberg entered the
race late, skipped early primaries and refused to spend his money to meet the threshold.116 Thus,
he was excluded from several debates in late January and early February. The DNC got rid of the
funding threshold in February and changed the requirements to 10% or higher in four qualifying
polls or winning at least one delegate in an early primary state.117 The party changed the rules
because they believed that “now that the grassroots support is actually captured in real voting,
the criteria will no longer require a donor threshold.”118 The rules can change if the party wants
them to change. This gives the party flexibility during the primary process to control the debate
stage. While Bloomberg qualified for the February 19th NBC debate, Yang and Steyer did not.119
Their exclusion eventually contributed to the end of their respective campaigns. The DNC’s
decision to change the criteria in the middle of the process demonstrates their ability to
manipulate the process and candidate selection. Despite instituting early clear qualifications for
inclusion in debates, the DNC can still bend rules to keep certain candidates off the debate stage
and allow others to participate.
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The DNC’s new debate rules for 2020 also helped the party grow its grassroots
connections, which in turn strengthens the party itself. By incentivizing candidates to prioritize
donations using the grassroots funding threshold for the debates, the DNC has expanded its
network of activists. Tom Perez was chosen to lead the DNC in part due to his experience in this
type of organizing. A day before the 2018 midterm elections, Perez met with Robert Siegel from
National Public Radio to speak about his priorities as DNC Chair. He asserted that “mobilizing is
that sprint up to the election. But [the Democrats] weren’t good at organizing. Organizing is the
marathon. It's talking to people 12 months a year. It's building relationships with people. And
[the Democrats] used to be the best at that.”120 Perez hopes that the threshold requirement will
help the DNC in the general election. By encouraging donations of any size, Perez wants to
inspire as many people as possible to participate in politics. This large base of donors may not
only help fund the general election, but also may encourage people to volunteer or participate in
other ways to support the Democrats. In addition, the DNC is requiring campaigns to use
ActBlue to collect the donations and to report them to the DNC.121 The site collects information
about donors including their credit card number, address and occupation. The valuable data is
stored by the site and can be used by the DNC for future solicitations. This data, now owned by
the DNC, strengthens the party by expanding its network and its fundraising capacity. The new
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2020 debate rules not only cultivate more donors for the party, but also strengthens the party
itself.
Future research on the topic should include on a comprehensive analysis of the 2020
nomination process. Since this paper was written during the 2020 nomination process, it was
difficult to include all aspects of the debates. In addition, future research should include
interviews with members of each campaign and interviews with DNC officials. These sources
could provide more in-depth perspectives on the debate criteria rules and their impact.

50

Charap
Bibliography
“ABC News Announces Criteria for New Hampshire Republican Debate.” ABC News. ABC
News Network. Accessed March 2, 2020. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/abc-news-announcescriteria-hampshire-republican-debate/story?id=36550263.
Adkins, Randall E., and Andrew J. Dowdle. "The Money Primary: What Influences the Outcome
of Pre-Primary Presidential Nomination Fundraising?" Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, no. 2
(2002): 256-75. Accessed February 19, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/27552387.
Aldrich, John H. “A Dynamic Model of Presidential Nomination Campaigns.” American
Political Science Review 74, no. 3 (1980): 651–69.
Aldrich, John H. Why Parties?: Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in
America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, 283, 12.
Allen, Mike, and Adam B. Lerner. “Fox Lowers Threshold for Early Debate.” POLITICO, July
30, 2015. https://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/fox-republican-debate-lowers-threshold120748.
“All Things Considered,” All Things Considered (National Public Radio, November 8, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/08/562903167/dnc-chair-tom-perez-on-what-this-years-electionmeans-for-the-party
Anderson, Christopher L. “Which Party Elites Choose to Lead the Nomination
Process?” Political Research Quarterly 66, no. 1 (2013): 61-76. Accessed February 18, 2020.
Azari, Julia, and Seth Masket. “Intraparty Democracy and the 2016 Election.” In Conventional
Wisdom, Parties and Broken Barriers in the 2016 Election. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2018., 146.
Ball-Rokeach, S.J., and M.L. DeFleur. “A Dependency Model of Mass-Media
Effects.” Communication Research 3, no. 1 (January 1976): 3–21
Barbara Norrander, “The Attrition Game: Initial Resources, Initial Contests and the Exit of
Candidates During the US Presidential Primary Season,” British Journal of Political Science 36,
no. 3 (2006): pp. 487-507, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123406000251.
Barnes, James, and Jerrick Adams. “2016 Presidential Nominations: Calendar and Delegate
Rules.” Ballotpedia.
https://ballotpedia.org/2016_presidential_nominations:_calendar_and_delegate_rules.
Belonsky, Andrew. “Gravel Pissed Over HRC Diss.” Queerty. Queerty, July 11, 2007.
https://www.queerty.com/gravel-pissed-over-hrc-diss-20070711.

51

Charap
Benoit et al., The Primary Decision, 344, 346; and Kendall, Communication in Presidential
Primaries, 88.
Berman, Russell. “The DNC Isn't Apologizing for Its Debate Rules.” The Atlantic. Atlantic
Media Company, June 13, 2019.
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/06/democratic-debate-rules/591550/.
Berr, Jonathan. “Media Companies Profit Handsomely from the Political Ads Voters Despise.”
Forbes Magazine, November 2, 2018.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanberr/2018/11/02/media-companies-profit-handsomelyfrom-the-political-ads-voters-despise/#2b2180833828.
Best, Samuel, and Clark Hubbard. “The Role of Televised Debates in the Presidential
Nomination Process.” In In Pursuit of the White House 2000. New York: Chatham House, 2000,
278.
Blake, Aaron. “Here Are the Latest, Most Damaging Things in the DNC's Leaked Emails.” The
Washington Post. WP Company, July 25, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/07/24/here-are-the-latest-most-damaging-things-in-the-dncs-leaked-emails/.
Burke, Edmund. Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents: Volume 1 Paperback. New
Edition ed., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2012. muse.jhu.edu/book/18234.
Burns, Alexander. “Gillibrand Drops Out of 2020 Democratic Presidential Race.” The New York
Times. The New York Times, August 28, 2019.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/us/politics/kirsten-gillibrand-2020-drop-out.html.
Busch, Andrew, and William Mayer. “The Front-Loading Problem.” In The Making of the
Presidential Candidates 2004. New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 2004, 33.
“Candidate Criteria for the October 13, 2015 CNN-Facebook Democratic Presidential Primary
Debate.” Turner Broadcasting, October 13, 2015.
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2015/images/09/28/final-democratic-criteria-2016.pdf.
Carleton, William G. “The Revolution in the Presidential Nominating Convention.” Political
Science Quarterly 72, no. 2 (1957): 227.
Cline, Seth. “Americans Have Stopped Watching the Democratic Debates.” U.S. News & World
Report. U.S. News & World Report, December 20, 2019.
https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/2019-12-20/americans-have-stopped-watchingthe-democratic-debates.
Cohen, Marty. The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations before and after Reform. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2008.

52

Charap
Dan Merica, “Kirsten Gillibrand Drops out of 2020 Presidential Race,” CNN (Cable News
Network, August 29, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/28/politics/gillibrand-drops-out-ofrace/index.html)
Davis, Susan. “Joe Biden Gets Boost With Endorsement Of Influential South Carolina
Democrat.” NPR, February 26, 2020. https://www.npr.org/2020/02/26/808856350/clyburnendorses-biden-ahead-of-south-carolina-primary.
DeSilver, Drew. “Voter Files: What Are They, How Are They Used and Are They Accurate?”
Pew Research Center. Pew Research Center, February 15, 2018.
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/02/15/voter-files-study-qa/.
Detrow, Scott. “Clinton Campaign Had Additional Signed Agreement With DNC In 2015.”
NPR. NPR, November 3, 2017. https://www.npr.org/2017/11/03/561976645/clinton-campaignhad-additional-signed-agreement-with-dnc-in-2015.
“DNC Announces Details for Seventh Democratic Presidential Primary Debate.” Democrats,
December 20, 2019. https://democrats.org/news/dnc-announces-details-for-seventh-democraticpresidential-primary-debate/.
“DNC Announces Details for The First Two Presidential Primary Debates,” Democrats,
February 14, 2019, https://democrats.org/news/dnc-announces-details-for-the-first-twopresidential-primary-debates/
“DNC Announces Details for Third Presidential Primary Debate,” Democrats, May 29, 2019,
https://democrats.org/news/third-debate/
“DNC Announces Qualification Criteria for Arizona Democratic Presidential Primary Debate.”
Democrats, March 9, 2020. https://democrats.org/news/dnc-announces-qualification-criteria-forarizona-democratic-presidential-primary-debate/.
“DNC Announces Qualification Criteria for Fifth Presidential Primary Debate,” Democrats,
September 23, 2019, https://democrats.org/news/dnc-announces-qualification-criteria-for-fifthpresidential-primary-debate/
“DNC Announces Qualification Criteria for Nevada Democratic Presidential Primary Debate.”
Democrats, February 3, 2020. https://democrats.org/news/dnc-announces-qualification-criteriafor-nevada-democratic-presidential-primary-debate/.
“DNC Announces Qualification Criteria for New Hampshire Democratic Presidential Primary
Debate.” Democrats, January 17, 2020. https://democrats.org/news/dnc-announces-qualificationcriteria-for-new-hampshire-democratic-presidential-primary-debate/.
Downs, Anthony. “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy.” Journal of
Political Economy 65, no. 2 (1957): 135-50. Accessed February 19, 2020.

53

Charap
Duverger, M. Political Parties. London: Methuen, 1978.
Epstein, Reid J. “D.N.C. Tells Pollsters to Do More Polls.” The New York Times, January 3,
2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/us/politics/dnc-debate-polls.html.
Falcone, Michael. “Ron Paul Makes an Appeal for Third-Party Candidates.” The New York
Times. The New York Times, September 9, 2008.
https://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/09/ron-paul-makes-an-appeal-for-third-partycandidates/.
Fridkin, Kim L., Patrick J. Kenney, Sarah Allen Gershon, Karen Shafer, and Gina Serignese
Woodall. “Capturing the Power of a Campaign Event: The 2004 Presidential Debate in Tempe.”
The Journal of Politics 69, no. 3 (2007): 770-85.
Frizell, Sam. “Lawrence Lessig Would Not Have Qualified for CBS Debate.” Time, November
5, 2015. https://time.com/4102049/democratic-debate-cbs-lawrence-lessig/
Gary R. Orren and Nelson W. Polsby, Media and Momentum: the New Hampshire Primary and
Nomination Politics (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1987), p.6
Geer, John, Richard Lau, David Nickerson, and Lynn Vavreck. “Advertising in an Era of
Choice.” manuscript. Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions at Vanderbilt University
(2012).
Getler, Michael. “Debates Are On; Debaters Are Off.” PBS. Public Broadcasting Service,
September 20, 2007.
https://www.pbs.org/ombudsman/2007/09/debates_are_on_debaters_are_off.html.
Gold, Hadas, and Gabriel Debenedetti. “MSNBC, Union Leader Team up for Unsanctioned
Democratic Debate.” POLITICO, January 26, 2016. https://www.politico.com/blogs/onmedia/2016/01/nbc-union-leader-team-up-for-unsanctioned-debate-218249.
Gough, Paul J. “ABC Sees 2 Sides to New Hampshire Debate.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters,
November 26, 2007. https://www.reuters.com/article/television-debates-dc/abc-sees-2-sides-tonew-hampshire-debate-idUSN2643539320071126.
“Gravel Supporter Putting Money Where Mouth Is.” Boston Globe, October 27, 2007.
http://www.boston.com/news/local/new_hampshire/articles/2007/10/27/gravel_supporter_putting
_money_where_mouth_is/
Grynbaum, Michael. “Record Ratings for Democratic Debate as America Tunes In to 2020.” The
New York Times, June 28, 2019.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/28/business/media/democratic-debate-nbc-ratings.html.

54

Charap
Hacker, Jacob S., and Paul Pierson. “After the ‘Master Theory’: Downs, Schattschneider, and the
Rebirth of Policy-Focused Analysis.” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 3 (2014): 643–62.
https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592714001637.
Haley, Jeff . “Gravel Dismisses CNN, WMUR-TV And Union Leader Statement.” _CNN_. 21
Mar. 2007. _Internet Archive_. <
https://web.archive.org/web/20071227034815/http://www.gravel2008.us/?q=node%2F471>.
Jackson, David. “New NBC Debate Criteria Could Pose Problems for O'Malley.” USA Today.
Gannett Satellite Information Network, January 11, 2016.
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/01/08/nbc-democratic-debatecriteria-clinton-sanders-omalley/78502784/.
Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, and Christopher Adasiewicz. “What Can Voters Learn from Election
Debates?” Televised Election Debates, 2000, 25–42.
John G. Geer, Nominating Presidents (New York: Greenwood, 1989); Scott Keeter and Cliff
Zukin, Uniformed Choice: The Failure of the New Presidential Nominating System (New York:
Praeger, 1983)
Kelly, Caroline. “De Blasio: 'It's Really Tough to Conceive of Continuing' Campaign without
Making October Debate.” CNN. Cable News Network, September 4, 2019.
https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/04/politics/bill-de-blasio-campaign-october-debate/index.html.
Levy, Adam. “DNC Changes Superdelegate Rules in Presidential Nomination Process.” CNN,
Cable News Network, 25 Aug. 2018, www.cnn.com/2018/08/25/politics/democratssuperdelegates-voting-changes/index.html.
Marre, Klaus. “Kucinich Booted from Iowa Debate.” The Hill, December 12, 2007.
https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/902-kucinich-booted-from-iowa-debate.
Masonhall, Erika. “Qualifying Criteria for NBC NBC-YOUTUBE Democratic Candidates
Debates.” NBCNews. NBCUniversal News Group, January 8, 2016.
http://press.nbcnews.com/2016/01/08/qualifying-criteria-for-nbc-news-youtube-democraticcandidates-debate/.
Max Greenwood, “Tougher Debate Threshold Sets off Scramble among 2020 Democrats,” The
Hill (The Hill, June 8, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/447500-tougher-debatethreshold-sets-off-scramble-among-2020-democrats
Mccarty, Nolan, and Eric Schickler. “On the Theory of Parties.” Annual Review of Political
Science 21, no. 1 (November 2018): 175–93. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-061915123020.

55

Charap
Mitchell, Ben, and Caitlin Huey-Burns. “The Revolution Will Be Online: How Democrats Are
Trying to Catch up to Trump.” CBS News, June 3, 2019. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/therevolution-will-be-online-how-democrats-are-trying-to-catch-up-to-trump/.
Niquette, Mark. “Bloomberg Says He Won’t Accept Contributions to Make the Debates.”
Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, January 30, 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202001-30/bloomberg-says-he-won-t-accept-contributions-to-make-the-debates.
“New Realities, New Thinking”: Report of the Task Force on Campaign Finance Reform. PS:
Political Science and Politics 30, no. 3 (1997): 487-89.
O'Keefe, Ed. “RNC Votes to Exclude CNN, NBC from 2016 Presidential Primary Debates.” The
Washington Post. WP Company, August 16, 2013. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2013/08/16/rnc-to-consider-excluding-cnn-nbc-from-2016-presidentialdebates/?arc404=true.
“Organized Labor and the 2008 Presidential Primary Campaign.” Eric M. Appleman/Democracy
in Action. http://p2008.org/interestg08/labor08.html.
Paul-Henri Gurian, “Resource Allocation Strategies in Presidential Nomination
Campaigns,” American Journal of Political Science 30, no. 4 (1986): p. 802,
https://doi.org/10.2307/2111274)
Preston, Mark. “CNN Amends GOP Presidential Debate Criteria - CNNPolitics.” CNN. Cable
News Network, September 2, 2015. https://www.cnn.com/2015/09/01/politics/cnn-debatecriteria-amendment/.
Robison, Josh, and Lorna Tychostup. “How the Media Picks Candidates.” _Z
Magazine_. 03 Jan. 2007. 1 Dec. 2006. _Internet Archive_. <
https://web.archive.org/web/20070103230928/http://zmagsite.zmag.org/Feb2004/tychostup0204.
html l>.
Russell Berman, “The DNC Isn't Apologizing for Its Debate Rules,” The Atlantic (Atlantic
Media Company, June 13, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/06/democratic-debate-rules/591550/
Schouten, Fredreka. “Kamala Harris Shines in Commanding Democratic Debate Performance.”
CNN. Cable News Network, June 28, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/27/politics/kamalaharris-democratic-debate-performance/index.html.
Seitz-Wald, Alex. “New DNC Debate Rules Open Door for Mike Bloomberg to Make Stage.”
NBCNews.com. NBC Universal News Group, January 31, 2020.
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/new-dnc-debate-rules-open-door-mikebloomberg-make-stage-n1127676.

56

Charap
Sides, John, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck. Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential
Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University
Press, 2018.
Steger, Wayne P. “Conditional Arbiters: The Limits of Political Party Influence in Presidential
Nominations.” PS: Political Science & Politics 49, no. 4 (2016): 709–15.
doi:10.1017/S1049096516001694.
Stelter, Brian. “NBC Wins Battle Over Debate.” The New York Times. The New York Times,
January 16, 2008. https://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/15/nbc-wins-battle-over-debate/.
Stevens, Matt. “Kamala Harris Surges in 3 Polls After Strong Debate Performance.” The New
York Times. The New York Times, July 2, 2019.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/us/politics/kamala-harris-polls.html.
Stevens, Matt. “When Kamala Harris and Joe Biden Clashed on Busing and Segregation.” The
New York Times. The New York Times, July 31, 2019.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/31/us/politics/kamala-harris-biden-busing.html.
Strauss, Daniel, et al. “Sanders Supporters Revolt against Superdelegates.” POLITICO, 14 Feb.
2016, www.politico.com/story/2016/02/bernie-sanders-superdelegates-democrats-219286.
Svitek, Patrick. “Key Goal for Texans Julián Castro and Beto O'Rourke in Tuesday's Debate:
Make the next One.” The Texas Tribune, October 15, 2019.
https://www.texastribune.org/2019/10/15/julian-castro-and-beto-orourke-campaigns-needstrong-debate-performanc/.
“The 2016 Endorsement Primary.” FiveThirtyEight, June 7, 2016.
https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2016-endorsement-primary/#endorsements.
“The Charter and Bylaws of the Democratic Party of the United States,” 2018.
Thomas E. Patterson, The Mass Media Election: How Americans Choose Their President (New
York: Praeger, 1980).
Thompson, Alex. “Perez Nixes 'Undercard' Debates for 2020 Primary.” POLITICO, December
20, 2018. https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/20/dnc-2020-democrats-debate-1071031.

57

